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In its most general form, a language universal is a proposition 
of universal scope, that is, it is asserted to hold over all lan-
guages. An assertion's universal scope does not insure that it is 
a significant generalization about the essence of language. In lin-
guistics, as in other sciences, law-like assertions must be distin-
guished from those which are not lawlike.2 It is usual to exclude 
two sorts of universals as nonsignificant. First are those universals 
which are definitional. A definitional universal makes an assertion 
about language which distinguishes it from other communication sys-
tems. Within linguistics, definitional universals are tautological, 
and cannot be refuted. The second sort of nonsignificant universal 
is the accidental universal. This is a universal which happens to 
be true but is of no consequence for the nature of language. 
One kind of accidental universal is an assertion which holds 
for the world's existing or recorded languages, but not for one or 
more possible nonexistent ones. This distinction implies that the 
world's languages are scattered over a universe of possible languages 
in an unknown manner. 
This is the source of the concern voiced by Hockett (1966) 
when he wrote that 'a feature can be widespread or even universal 
without being important,• evoking in illustration the situation in 
which all the world's languages but English become extinct: Chomsky 
and Halle (1968), speaking of 'apparent linguistic universals which 
may be the result merely of historical accident ••• and which are 
of no importance for general linguistics,' echoed this apocalyptic 
view, nominating Tasmanians as survivors. 
This shows that it is necessary to understand 'all languages', 
in the statement of a universal, as referring to a wider class of 
languages than just those now existing or those that have been des-
cribed. Does this mean that generalizations based on samples of 
languages are not to be taken seriously? No, for empirical evidence 
from even on~ language is of some weight. A proposition that holds 
for a few hundred languages must be taken seriously. But the dis-
tinction between existing languages and possible languages does 
remind us that even if the proposition were to be validated for all 
the world's languages, we would still not be assured of its linguis-
tic significance. 
The search for linguistic universals can be divided into three 
steps. The first is discovering a generalization, and testing it 
against empirical evidence. This might be called puzzle-finding. 
The next stage, which is what concerns me most here, is assessing 
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the significance of the generalization. In other words, is it a 
linguistic puzzle? Explaining the nature of the significance is a 
further step. 
How can a lawlike generalization be recognized? It is not a 
matter of overcoming the difficulties of sampling, as we have seen. 
Our ignorance about the representativeness of the world's languages 
with respect to language in general is a problem mainly relevant 
to the puzzle-solving stage, not to establishing significance. 
The answer is that a significant universal must have consequence. 
If a universal is proven false, and our reaction is 'So what?', 
then the universal could not have been significant. 
One approach is to show that a universal has consequence for 
the processes of linguistic change. This approach has been discussed 
at length by Greenberg (1966a, 1969). For example, consider this 
proposition: 
'In a given language the number of nasalized vowels is never 
greater than the number of nonnasal vowel phonemes.' (Ferguson 
1966). 
This generalization is significant because it has consequence for 
a hypothesis about processes of historical origin and mutation: 
namely that nasal vowels arise uniquely through the agency of a nasal 
consonant, and that the merger of oral vowels implies the merger 
of corresponding nasal vowels. If the generalization were proven 
false, these diachronic hypotheses would have to be revised. 
Now look at the second proposition: 
For all languages, if a language possesses clicks, then it 
possesses nasal consonants. 
This statement is not logically trivial, as it would be if we said 
that all .click languages possessed vowels. All languages possess 
vowels, but some languages do not have nasals. 3 Furthermore, the 
statement has no known exceptions. Nevertheless, it must be acci-
dental. Otherwise we would be led to inacceptable conclusions about 
diachronic process, namely that the processes that lead to loss of 
nasals are inhibited by the presence of clicks, or that clicks could 
not develop in the absence of nasal consonants. 
These two examples show that the lack of exceptions is no sure 
guide to significance. It also happens that the existence of excep-
tions to a generalization may not indicate its lack of significance. 
Greenberg (1969) discusses such a· case. The generalization concerns 
the place of occurrence of voiceless vowels within the word. In 
general, voiceless vowels occur word-finally if they occur anywhere. 
An exception to this generalization is the Japanese described by 
Bloch (1950), in which voiceless vowels do not occur finally. As 
always, exceptions may indicate that a generalization rests upon an 
inappropriate typology. In this case, one might consider whether 
one should perhaps subsume final silence under a category of voice-
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less segments. The new generalization, now covering the exceptions, 
would state that voiceless vowels occur between voiceless segments 
if they occur anywhere, and would imply that final position in itself 
has no special role. 
This move is revealed as incorrect when the significance of the 
generalizations is investigated in terms of diachronic process. 
Japanese has no final voiceless vowels not because they arose only 
elsewhere, but because a successive process of loss has eliminated 
final devoiced vowels. The originally stated preference for final 
position is indeed significant for the creation of voiceless vowels, 
but it is obscured on the synchronic plane by the action of an inter-
fering process. 
Such 1statistical 1 universals, as they are sometimes called, are 
unfortunately much more numerous than exceptionless synchronic uni-
versals. In fact, whenever synchronic states are the product of sev-
eral processes of origin and mutation, as is usual, exceptions to 
generalizations can be expected. It should be clear that they are 
not therefore to be automatically discarded, but deserve equal con-
sideration with exceptionless generalizations. · 
This is true even where the •exceptions' .are so numerous that 
it is obvious that no implicational hierarchy of occurrence ho.Ids. 
In classifying a sample of languages according to what kinds of 
syllabic nasals occurred in them, I obtained the distribution shown 
in the table below. · 
Inventory of 



















First of all, observe that all possibilities occur. One might con-
clude that the classification represents nothing but the chance 
of the sample. Certainly that would be. a likely possibility. Yet 
the predominance of occurrence of m is suggestive, particularly con-
sidering that for nasals in general, it is n that is favored. As 
it turned out, by careful consideration of the processes .of origin 
and mutation of syllabic nasals, I was able to show that in some 
circumstances m or ti will become syllabic if any riasal does. 4 
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This last example takes us beyond the idealized schema in which 
one first discovers a generalization, and then assesses its signi-
ficance. One could hardly say that there ever was a generalization 
about syllabic nasals until the diachronic regularity was discovered. 
The merging of the two steps is an advance that has much promise, and 
it is worth conscious pursuit. In this way process and state, dia-
chrony and synchrony, are considered simultaneously. The scope of 
generalizations is taken to be the universe of historically trans-
missible languages, but that universe is not regarded as a static 
inventory of objects. Because languages do not just happen, but 
are derived from other languages by processes of change, these pro-
cesses are considered as an integral part of the reference universe, 
so that no language exists in isolation, but is related to other 
languages by diachronic processes. 
An idealized paradigm for the process-state approach to typo-
logical comparison might be the following. Over some aspect of 
language structure a typology is constructed (according to type 
of vowel system, or type of syllable structure, for example). Based 
on this typology, a process-state model is constructed. Evidence 
for the model is not simply attested states and attested processes. 
The necessary connection between the two makes extended hypotheses 
inevitable: if there is an attested state, some process must lead 
to it, and if we find no acceptable process leading to an unattested 
state, we must consider the possibility that it does not occur. 5 
In the case of the syllabic nasals, the concept of a process-
state model was a neuristic guide. In studying -the problem of the 
primacy of the CV syllable, I found an explicit use of a process-
state model to be fruitful.6 The relevant empirical synchronic 
generalization is that all lan~uages possess syllables of at least 
two types, of which one is CV {Greenberg, Osgood, and Jenkins 1966). 
Upon examining the various possible syllable types and the pro-
cesses that relate them, there does not appear to be any absolute 
stricture that would prevent a language with the unique syllabic 
form CV. The same holds for a language with just the syllable types 
CVC and VC, and similarly for other nonoccurring inventories. This 
is perhaps one reason why the significance of the generalization 
has been doubted. Yet the conditions for the creation of these sylla-
bic inventories are so special, and the generality of the processes 
that would reduce them to types falling within the categories speci-
fied in the generalization is so great, that such languages must clearly 
be very rare and of short duration within the type. Thus the process-
state approach in this case suggests that the generalization stated 
in terms of nonoccurrence of types is an accidental one, and that 
the significant linguistic regularity has to do With the relative 
likelihood of occurrence of the relevant processes. 
The last two examples possess an interesting sort of complemen-
tarity. Concerning the CV syll ab 1 e, I concluded that an exception-
1 ess universal was significant only in a probabalistic sense, whereas 
the statistical preference for syllabic m and D was relateable to an 
implicational diachronic regularity. 
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There are other paths to the study of universals than the one 
I have been discussing. Prominent among them is the transformation-
al ist approach, represented by Chomsky. The differences between the 
two approaches sometimes appear to be so great that it is hard to 
realize that they have the same goal. Much of the difference, I 
think, can be understood as consequences of different concepts of 
assessing significance. 
The transformationalist view is that significant universals 
must have consequence for the acquisition of language. The follow-
ing statements are typical of many that have appeared in the last 
five years: 
The significant language universals are those that must be as-
sumed to be available to the child learning a language as an 
a priori, innate endowment. (Chomsky and Halle 1968:4) • 
••• nontrivial universals ••• are properties that all natural 
languages have, though not by definition, and indeed any possible 
natural language must have if it is to be learned and under-
stood by humans in the normal manner. (Moravcsik 1967:224). 
Let us call universals of language that are essential to acqui-
sition 'acquisition-significant' universals. An appropriate term 
for universals of the sort discussed earlier is 'transmission-sig-
nificant' universals. 
An acquisition-significant universal is necessarily transmission 
significant. A language cannot be transmitted if it cannot be ac-
quired. The converse is not necessarily tru~, since the hi~torical 
transmission of language involves cultural processes not associated 
with acquisition. In fact, there do exist universals that are trans-
mission-significant but not acquisition-significant. Most of the 
generalizations considered so far are examples. Take Ferguson's 
proposition concerning nasal vowels. It is unlikely to be acqui-
sition-significant; in the absence of an operational test, I presume 
that a language with more nasal vowels than oral vowels may be ac-
quired in a natural way. 
With the help of the figure below we may look at the difference 
between the two from another angle. 
E = existing languages 
T = historically trans-
missible languages 
A = naturally acquirable 
languages 
p = logically possible 
languages 
Diagram of sets of languages. 
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Transmission-significant universals hold over the set of histori-
cally transmissible languages. This is a proper subset of the natu-
rally acquirable languages, over which acquisition-significant uni-
versals hold. 
With this background, we can return to the comparison of the 
two approaches. An example of an acquisition-significant universal 
will be helpful. The best-known is probably the principle of cyclic 
ordering in phonology: • ••. the phonological component of a grammar 
consists of a sequence of rules that apply in a cyclic manner ••• 1 
(Chomsky 1967:415). 
That this generalization, like most acquisition-significant 
universals, concerns underlying structure, whereas those claimed 
to be transmission-significant usually concern surface features of 
language, is no accident. It is a consequence of the different 
notions of significance. The statement of Chomsky (1965:209) 
• ••• that only descriptions concerned with deep structure will have 
serious import for proposals concerning linguistic universals' is 
only understandable if we take it to refer to acquisition-signifi-
cant universals. Languages' surface structures exhibit much regu-
larity, but for the most part it is hard to conceive that such regu-
larities are essential to language acquisition. On the other hand, 
the lack of evidence for the diachronic development of underlying 
structure accounts for the virtual absence of attempts to show the 
significance of regularities in the underlying structure to histor-
i ca 1 processes:. 
The constraints imposed upon language by acquisition-significant 
universals tend to be less evident and less explicit than transmission-
significant universals. In the case of the cyclic principle, its 
significance to acquisition is not so much that it defines languages 
that a child could not acquire, but that it must be • ••• one part 
of the schematism that the child brings to language learning' (Chom-
sky 1967:416). The claim that the schematism is highly restricted 
is based on indirect arguments concerning the rate of acquisition, 
nature of the linguistic data available to the child, etc. In con-
trast, the usual argument for the significance of a universal to 
transmission specifies the kinds of languages that cannot occur since 
their absence can be attributed to conditions on the processes of 
change that affect them. 
The weaknesses and strengths of the approaches lie mainly in 
a final contrast. The approach of transmission-significance permits 
investigation of a broader range of linguistic phenomena, but it 
makes no committment as to where one should look for the explanation 
of linguistic universals in terms of nonlinguistic phenomena, although 
the desirability of such wider explanation is patent •. 
The claim of significance to acquisition presupposes that the 
ultimate explanation lies in man's psychophysical capacities. The 
claim may be mistaken, of course. Even the principle of the ordering 
of phonological rules may turn out to be only transmission-signifi-
cant, as Chafe's (1968) discussion suggests. The risk is acceptable, 
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for the prize is great, not to be won easily. If such ultimate ex-
planations are to be found at all, it is necessary to focus on the 
limited set of linguistic structures that are significant to acqui-
sition and consider them simultaneously with the nature of cogni-
tive processes. 
Linguistics needs both approaches to the search for universals. 
There will always be those who will seek the mother lode on the 
mountains of acquisition-significance, but the fertile plains of 
transmission-significance will also yield riches to those who will 
till them. · 
NOTES 
1An earlier version of this paper was written while I was a member 
of the Stanford Project on Language Universals (NSF Grant GS 1880). 
I am indebted to comments by J.H. Greenberg, Fred Householder, 
Edith Moravcsik, and Julius Moravcsik. 
2A general review and discussion of the problem may be found in Hem-
pe 1 ( 1966) , Chapter 5. 
3Quileute and a few other Salishan and Wakashan languages, according 
to Ferguson (1966). 
4The actual situation is more complex than this schematized account 
may indicate. See Bell (1970) for a full account. 
5A similar principle was enunciated by Greenberg, Osgood, and Jen-
kins (1966:xxiii): 
••• no synchronic state can exist which is not the outcome of 
poss i b 1 e diachronic processes (except perhaps de !!.2.Y.Q. for arti-
ficial and pidgin languages) and no diachronic process can be 
posited which could lead to a synchronic state which-violates a 
universally valid synchronic norm. 
6Some of this research will be reported in a paper to be delivered 
at the LSA meeting in Washington, D.C., December 28-30, 1970. 
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